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TAGS: [PINR](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: (U) SUDAN AND REGIONAL ACTORS (C-AL9-02504)

REF: A. KHARTOUM 001343
[1](#)B. KHARTOUM 001146
[1](#)C. KHARTOUM 001273

Classified By: ELISSA G. PITTERLE, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS

[1](#)1. (S/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ARE APPRECIATIVE OF POST'S PAST REPORTING ON SUDAN'S RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ACTORS. FOR EXAMPLE, REF A CONFIRMED OUR ANALYTIC LINE OF THOUGHT ON EGYPT'S CONCERNS ABOUT AN INDEPENDENT SOUTHERN SUDAN, PARTICULARLY IF THE SOUTH TRIES TO PURSUE LARGE-SCALE IRRIGATION PROJECTS ALONG THE NILE AFTER ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE. THIS CABLE WILL BE USED IN LONG-TERM WRITTEN PRODUCTS LOOKING AT SOUTH SUDAN VIABILITY. IN ADDITION, REF B AND REF C WERE HELPFUL IN KEEPING RECORD OF AND ASSESSING KHARTOUM'S ONGOING EFFORTS REGARDING DIALOGUE WITH CHAD. THESE CABLES WERE USED IN A WRITTEN PRODUCT ON SUDAN-CHAD RELATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS.

[1](#)2. (C) WE REMAIN INTERESTED IN SUDAN'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS THE PERCEPTION THAT SUDAN'S NEIGHBORS HAVE ABOUT THE VARIOUS INTERNAL SUDANESE CONFLICTS, GIVEN THAT THESE CONFLICTS HAVE POTENTIAL CROSS-BORDER IMPLICATIONS. AS TIME AND RESOURCES PERMIT, ANALYSTS WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE REPORTING ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

[1](#)A. (S/REL TO FVEY) FROM KHARTOUM'S PERSPECTIVE, WHAT ARE THE DYNAMICS OF BILATERAL/MULTILATERAL RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING/REGIONAL COUNTRIES? WHO DOES THE NATIONAL CONGRESS PARTY (NCP) LOOK TO FOR CONTINUED POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC SUPPORT?

[1](#)B. (S/REL TO FVEY) WHAT ARE KHARTOUM'S RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION; THE MIDDLE EAST; NORTH, CENTRAL, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA; CENTRAL, SOUTH, AND EAST ASIA; AND LATIN AMERICA?

[1](#)C. (S/REL TO FVEY) WHAT ARE KHARTOUM'S POLICIES, PLANS AND INTENTIONS REGARDING ITS PARTICIPATION IN OR RELATIONS WITH MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE EU, UN, NATO, OAS, THE ARAB LEAGUE, THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COUNTRIES, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, ASEAN, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?

[1](#)D. (S/REL TO FVEY) WHAT ARE KHARTOUM'S POLICIES, PLANS AND INTENTIONS FOR CONTRIBUTING TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

[1](#)E. (S/REL TO FVEY) WHAT ARE KHARTOUM'S POLICIES, PLANS, INTENTIONS, AND ACTIONS FOR SUPPORTING ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER IN THE CIVIL CONFLICTS OF ITS NEIGHBORS (I.E., THE UGANDA VS. LRA CONFLICT)?

[1](#)F. (S/REL TO FVEY) HOW ARE SUDAN'S NEIGHBORS (INCLUDING LIBYA, CHAD, ETHIOPIA, ERITREA, UGANDA, AND KENYA) PREPARING FOR POSSIBLE SOUTHERN SECESSION?

[1](#)G. (S/REL TO FVEY) WHAT ARE REGIONAL NEIGHBORS' POLICIES, PLANS OR REFLECTIONS REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF DEMOGRAPHIC MOVEMENTS OUT OF SUDAN FOLLOWING A POTENTIAL RESUMPTION IN

VIOLENCE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH?

13. (U) PLEASE CITE C-AL9-02504 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF
REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS.
CLINTON